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This paper studies the value of external commitment to policy reforms in the case of WTO/GATT
accessions. The accessions often entail reforms that go beyond narrowly defined trade liberalization,
and have to overcome fierce resistance in the acceding countries, as reflected in protracted negotiations.
We study the growth and investment consequences of WTO/GATT accessions, with attention to a
possible selection bias. We find that the accessions tend to raise income , but only for those countries
that were subject to rigorous accession procedures. Policy commitments associated with the accessions
were helpful, especially for countries with poor governance.
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“… It is surprisingly hard to demonstrate convincingly that the GATT and the WTO have encouraged 
trade.”  
Andrew Rose 
American Economic Review, 2004 
 
“WTO accession provides a predictable business environment and gives a powerful guarantee to 
investors that there will be no policy reversals.” 
 
Mamo Mihretu, advisor to the Ethiopian government on WTO accession 
International Development Research Center, 2005 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One way a country can acquire strong commitment to pro-growth policy reforms and 
convince investors that it has done so is by making the commitment a part of its international 
obligations. Examples of such external commitment include tariff reductions in a treaty that 
governs the terms of a country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
foregoing the right to impose capital controls in the future in a free trade agreement (FTA), a 
privatization scheme made as a part of the conditionality in a World Bank loan, or a tax 
reform plan made as a part of the conditionality in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
supported program. The value of such an external commitment is intuitive. While a 
government’s unilateral announcement or implementation of a policy reform can be reversed 
or undone unilaterally, a policy reform embedded in an international treaty would involve a 
much higher cost of reversal. Non-fulfillment of an external commitment could trigger 
termination of loan disbursement from the World Bank or the IMF, or sanctions from the 
dispute settlement mechanism at the WTO or the FTA. In political economy terms, the 
benefits conferred by the multilateral organization (e.g., more secured access to foreign 
markets through the WTO, or loans from the IMF) can be used by the reform-minded 
government to buy political support from the originally anti-reform interest groups. 
However, it is not a foregone conclusion that the value of such external commitment 
is positive. For example, some have accused IMF supported programs of having made some 
countries economically worse off, as they might advocate a rigid recipe of policy changes 
that may not be suitable for the countries (see, for example, views by Feldstein, 1999, and 
Stiglitz, 2002). A rigorous analysis by Barro and Lee (2005) that incorporates a clever 
strategy to model which countries receive IMF supported programs suggests that   - 3 - 
participation in IMF programs does not generally enhance a country’s growth prospect and 
may have reduced it. So there is certainly room for the possibility of making external 
commitment to a wrong set of policies. This can be the case when the negotiating partners of 
the treaties do not necessarily have the country’s best interest as their objective or simply 
misunderstand what is good for the country. Moreover, even if the commitments are good, 
there is a separate question of whether they can be enforced or sustained in the long run. In 
the case of IMF programs, the countries might reverse the prescribed reforms once the 
programs expire. 
In this paper, we study the case of accessions to the WTO (or its predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT). Unlike policy commitments made in an 
IMF program, policy reforms mandated in an WTO accession agreement are legally binding 
as long as the country remains a member of the WTO. The accessions are sometimes 
reported with fanfare, as was the case for China in 2001. In recent years, the applicant 
countries are typically required by existing members to undertake a wide range of policy 
changes before membership can be granted and to promise to do more within a certain 
timeframe after the start of membership. The required policy changes typically go beyond a 
reduction in tariff rates, and can encompass termination of state monopoly, greater 
transparency in policy making process generally, reduction in restrictions on payment and 
foreign exchange arrangement, and better protection of intellectual property rights
2. As the 
second quote at the beginning of the paper indicates, WTO accession is thought to make it 
less likely for governments to reverse market-oriented reforms. Many of these policy changes 
would have to overcome fierce resistance from anti-reform interest groups within the 
acceding countries. This is reflected in lengthy and often contentious negotiations between 
the acceding countries and the existing members. For example, for countries that acceded to 
the WTO during 1995-2001, the median time it took between the initial application and the 
final accession was 71 months. The view that WTO accession brings about pro-growth 
                                                 
2 More examples of reform conditions in recent accession cases that have implications 
outside trade are given in Table 10.   - 4 - 
reforms even if they may be politically difficult can be summarized by a Chinese adage: 
beneficial medicine may be bitter in one’s mouth.  
This view, however, is not universally shared. Some think that the membership is 
completely irrelevant. For example, Rose (2004) reports that WTO/GATT member countries 
do not appear to trade any more than non-members do. As Subramanian and Wei (2007) 
point out, since most developing-country members of the GATT/WTO acceded to the trade 
body at a time when very few reforms were required of them, it is not difficult to understand 
the irrelevance results. If WTO membership does not even lead to a more open trade regime, 
then it is hard to see how it could deliver beneficial reforms in other ways. So, in this case, 
the medicine is neither bitter nor effective. 
According to some, accession to the WTO may even mean making counterproductive 
external commitments. The policy changes demanded by existing members of the 
WTO/GATT might narrow the “policy space,” and force the acceding countries to choose 
inferior policies that they otherwise would not have chosen. In a book entitled, “Behind the 
Scenes at the WTO: the Real World of International Trade Negotiations,” the authors 
Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa suggested that WTO negotiations place the interests of 
powerful developed countries ahead of everyone else and often coerce developing countries 
into signing something that they profoundly disagree with. By this view, the medicine is not 
only bitter but also poisonous. 
In the first four decades of the GATT, developing countries were not asked to do 
much reform if they wanted to join the club. Indeed, many of them retained very high bound 
tariff rates even after becoming GATT members. However, the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations signifies a drastic change. One objective of the Uruguay Round was to bridge 
the gap between the developed and developing countries in terms of their degree of 
liberalization and obligations. New acceding countries are subject to much more stringent 
accession requirements. For instance, under the old GATT rules, an existing member might 
be able to invoke nonapplication only on the condition that it had never entered bilateral 
negotiations with the acceding country; however, under the new WTO regime, an existing 
member could opt to not extend its WTO-related benefits to the new member even after they   - 5 - 
had held bilateral negotiations. For example, the United States had invoked the 
nonapplication clause against the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Georgia, even after it had 
held bilateral negotiations with them. The United States would not have been allowed to 
exercise nonapplication in such a situation in the GATT era (Drabek and Bacchetta, 2004). 
Such threat of ex-post nonapplication potentially strengthens the leverage of existing 
members over an acceding country during the bilateral negotiations, and thus enable them to 
extract more concessions from the new member. 
Subramanian and Wei (2007) document that these new (i.e., post-Uruguay) members 
tend to be systematically more open than old developing country members of the GATT. On 
average, new developing country members of the WTO/GATT trade about 30 percent more 
than the old developing members. Thus, accessions to the WTO/GATT after the Uruguay 
Round offer an opportunity to empirically study the value to a country of making policy 
commitments externally.  
Specifically, in this paper we investigate whether and how WTO/GATT accession 
between 1990 and 2001 alters a country’s growth trajectories. The empirical method we 
employ is in spirit a difference-in-differences strategy: comparing the change in the growth 
rate of the acceding countries before and after accessions with the change in the growth rate 
of nonacceding developing countries. Our results show that, relative to other developing 
countries, countries that became WTO members did generally grow faster than before, and 
the increments in their ratios of investment to GDP were greater as well
3. 
Any good economist would instinctively ask whether there is any endogeneity bias in 
this result. Specifically, is it possible that only countries that would pursue pro-growth, open-
                                                 
3 We choose to leave developed countries out of our analysis. About half of the developed 
countries were cofounders of the GATT. A majority of the remaining ones joined the GATT 
by mid-1950s. We do not want to make developed countries to be part of the control group 
(when the treatment group consists of developing countries) as we wish to compare the like 
with the like. We do not want to make the developed countries to be the treatment group 
since it is not possible to construct a meaningful control group that consists of other 
developed countries. An interesting paper by Staiger and Tabellini (1999) shows that 
developed countries did gain policy commitment by embedding policy reforms as part of the 
“concessions” made in the Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiation.    - 6 - 
trade policies anyway would apply for GATT/WTO membership? Researchers might find a 
positive association between accession and an increase in the growth rate even though the 
former may not cause the latter. In some sense, we are just as happy with the possible result 
that reforms designed to promote trade openness rather than WTO accession per se have 
increased growth. In this scenario, application for GATT/WTO membership is simply a 
demonstration of a government’s resolve to switch to a more open trade regime. Our exercise 
can be seen simply as a new angle to check the consequence of trade reforms for growth. 
We, however, document a number of patterns in the data that enhance our confidence 
that the WTO commitments may causally improve investment climate and help to raise the 
growth rate. Besides implementing a Heckman procedure that explicitly models the selection 
issue, we also make use of a number of economic and institutional features of the WTO 
accession process that turn out to be informative. We summarize these features below. 
1. Accessions with and without extensive reforms. If accession involves no binding 
commitments, then the endogeneity bias is highly plausible. However, plenty of evidence 
shows that the accession negotiations can be very demanding on the acceding countries, often 
with anti-reform interest groups resisting strenuously the reform requirements from the 
existing members. The long accession negotiations (with an average of about five years) 
indicate the immense political difficulty many acceding countries have in implementing 
various reforms required of them. In fact, an interesting difference among the accession 
countries is informative about whether accession-related reforms have helped to change the 
domestic investment climate. Up to the end of 1994, a subset of developing countries were 
eligible to join the GATT under Article XXVI 5(c) by essentially sending a notification to 
the GATT without having to promise reforms. Existing members could not block the 
accession and therefore could not impose demands that the acceding countries would feel 
reluctant to fulfill. In contrast, the rest of the developing countries would have to undergo 
rigorous negotiations with existing members because any of the latter countries could block 
the accession. Almost all Article XXVI 5(c)-eligible countries joined the GATT by 1994 
without making extensive reform commitments. We will show that the positive impact of 
WTO/GATT accession comes entirely from countries that were required to undergo more 
rigorous accession negotiations.   - 7 - 
2. Application vs. actual accession. It is possible that an application for membership 
may signal that the government has become reform-minded and may pursue pro-growth 
reforms regardless of the membership. Because a long and variable lag typically exists 
between the date of application and that of the eventual accession, we can exploit this gap to 
isolate the effect of accession-induced reforms from the effect of reforms that a government 
wants to implement anyway. We find that there is a (temporary) pickup in the growth rate 
subsequent to the initial application. However, even after accounting for this pattern, we 
continue to find a distinct growth spurt after the actual accession. 
   3. Modeling the selection effect. We also explicitly test for and quantify the effects of 
self-selection on economic performance by employing a two-stage procedure a la Heckman 
(1979). We do not find evidence of a strong selection bias that drives our result. 
4. Effects of reform commitments on countries of different governance quality. If 
accession has no additional economic impact beyond signaling a government’s resolve to 
pursue reforms unilaterally, then the association of accession with growth does not have to 
vary with the quality of public governance. We look at whether and how accession-induced 
policy reforms have differential impacts on countries of different governance quality. We 
find that the policy commitments through WTO accession appear to be more beneficial in 
countries with weak governance. This suggests that the external policy commitments may 
serve as a (partial) substitute for governance in promoting economic development. 
These four features are based on economic as well as statistical arguments. Taken 
together, they suggest that WTO/GATT accessions, when rigorous reforms are required of, 
have led countries to engage in a wide range of reforms, improve the general investment 
climate beyond narrowly defined trade areas, resulting in an acceleration of their growth rates 
around the time of the accession.  
Note that the accession may lead only to a one-off increase in the income level 
(though with a transition period of several years), not necessarily to a permanent increase in 
the growth rate. Of course, a temporary increase in growth rates for a few years implies a 
permanently larger economy and a permanently higher living standard in the end. So it is still 
economically significant. In any case, given that WTO accession cases are relatively recent,   - 8 - 
available data would not allow us to discriminate between a growth effect and a level effect 
that spreads over several years. 
Besides studying the value of commitments, this paper contributes to the literature on 
the effects of the WTO/GATT. Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007), and Goldstein, 
Rivers and Tomz (2007), among others, study the trade volume effects of the WTO (with 
different conclusions). Li and Wu (2004) explore the average effects of WTO/GATT 
accessions on growth during 1960 and 1998, but do not take into account the qualitative 
change in the nature of the accession process since the Uruguay Round, the role of Article 
XXVI 5(c), and the difference between applications and actual accessions. Ferrantino (2006) 
examine association between the accessions (and free trade agreements) and governance. 
In the following section, we briefly describe the data and our empirical methodology 
before presenting our results. We discuss the selection issue in greater detail in section 3. 
Section 4 explores the role of policy commitments as a substitute for good governance. We 
conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
2.A.  Data and Empirical Specifications 
The main variables employed in our regressions include per capita GDP, private 
investment, total investment, exports and imports of all the developing countries between 1981 
and 2003. All these data, at annual frequency, are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook. The panels are not always balanced, since some smaller countries might not have data 
for earlier years. The years the countries formally acceded to WTO/GATT are taken from 
WTO’s website. We exclude all OPEC and industrial countries. Table 1 lists all the countries in 
our treatment and control groups.
4 In most regressions, we also exclude ten outliers from the 
control group, five from either end of the spectrum (however, as we will report later, our results 
                                                 
4 Note that although we exclude all OPEC countries, 8 out of the 28 nonmember countries 
have a large share of output attributed to oil production (Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Yemen).    - 9 - 
are robust to not excluding the outliers). In later subsections, we will use additional variables 
such as governance indices and a measure of the extent of policy commitments. The sources and 
construction of those variables will be discussed in due course.  
The two principal sets of regressions we use look at the effects on growth and 
investment at annual frequency. They take the following forms. 
 
,, 0 1 ,, log( ) , its t s i t its s G GDP per capita ββ β β ε − =+ + + + ∑  and 
 
. ) / log( , , , , s t i t i s s s t i GDP Inv ε β β β + + + =∑  
 
s t i G , ,  and  s t i GDP Inv , , ) / log(  are, respectively, annual growth of per capita GDP and the log 
of the investment/GDP ratio of country i, in year t, and s years away from accession. We 
refer to the set of s’s as the time profile of accession. In most of our specifications, s belongs 
to {null, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, beyond}; s is null if either the country is not in our treatment 
group or it would not accede until more than two years later. Correspondingly, s β  is set at 
zero when s is null;  i β  and  t β  are country and year fixed effects, respectively. The log of 
lagged per capita GDP is included in the growth regressions to take into account the long-
term converging and short-term mean-reverting effects.
5 
 
2.B.  Benchmark Result (GATT/WTO Accessions During 1990-2001) 
One of the objectives of the Uruguay Round was to raise the developing countries’ 
obligations to adopt more open trade regimes. Even for countries that joined the GATT after 
the commencement but before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, Subramanian and Wei 
(2007) show evidence that accessions have led them to become more liberalized relative to 
both preexisting members as well as nonmembers. Guided by Subramanian and Wei’s 
                                                 
5 For data with short time series, the panel fixed-effect coefficient estimates of lagged 
dependent variables (i.e., the log of lagged GDP per capita in our growth regression) might 
not be consistent. But as we will later report, our estimates of  s β ’s with panel fixed effects 
are very similar to those with  0 β  specifically estimated by GMM.   - 10 - 
results, we focus on countries that acceded between 1990 and 2001. The summary statistics 
on growth, trade and investment for this group of countries before and after accession are 
reported in the first column of Table 2.  
We perform our growth and investment regressions as specified earlier. Figures 1 and 
2 plot, respectively, the trajectories of the changes in growth and investment for the accession 
countries relative to the control group after taking into account of other control variables in 
our regressions. The 90% confidence intervals are derived from robust standard errors 
clustered by country. As Figure 1 shows, in the year before accession countries are growing 
about 2.4 percentage points faster than before, relative to other countries. The growth rates 
stay high in the four subsequent years. These increases in growth are statistically significant. 
In comparison, as Figure 2 shows, while accessions are associated with an increase in the 
investment ratio, the effect is not statistically significant. 
The regression details are reported in Table 3A. Ten outlying control-group countries 
are excluded from the first two columns of the table, while the last two columns report results 
without such exclusion. Both the coefficient estimates and their significance levels are 
essentially the same across the two sets of results. Following Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker 
(2003), we also perform a F-test for first-order serial correlation in the error term in our 
linear panel-data model, and find no evidence of first-order serial correlation at the 10% level 
(with F(1, 104)=2.31 and a p-value of 0.13). 
One may wonder whether the growth effect of GATT accessions prior to the Uruguay 
Round is statistically and economically significant. Table 3B reports the growth and 
investment regressions for these earlier accessions (compared with non-accession countries 
during the same period). In the growth regression, the point estimates are all positive, but 
much smaller than the estimates for the more recent accessions. Moreover, the growth effect 
of the earlier accessions is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the effect 
of the earlier accessions on private investment is not statistically significant either. This 
contrast between the early and the more recent accessions is not surprising, echoing the 
observation that developing countries in the early episodes were typically exempted from 
undertaking comprehensive economic reforms under the principle of a special and 
differential treatment. In fact, the early accessions did not even significantly make these   - 11 - 
developing countries more open in the trade area, as documented by Subramanian and Wei 
(2007).In the rest of the paper, we will focus on accessions that take place since 1990. 
 
Article XXVI 5(c) vs. Non-Article XXVI 5(c) Countries 
The results shown in Figures 1 and 2 mask a substantial degree of heterogeneity 
among the countries in terms of their accession procedures. Before the WTO replaced the 
GATT in 1995, former colonies of the GATT members could, upon becoming independent, 
invoke GATT Article XXVI 5(c). The article had allowed them to be converted to full 
members (“contracting parties”) without having to undergo the kind of lengthy negotiations 
that often characterize the accession processes of other countries.
6  
Although once they had become full members they were required to fulfill more 
obligations (e.g., notifying GATT/WTO about any alteration of their trade policies to deal 
with balance of payments problems), policies of the countries acceding by Article XXVI 5(c) 
were not rigorously reviewed before the countries were granted accession. As a result, the 
extent of policy reforms those countries are required to commit to is substantially less. It is 
arguably a main reason why a host of countries that were eligible for Article XXVI 5 (c) 
flocked to accede to the GATT immediately before the WTO was established. 
Between 1990 and 1994, 18 countries invoked Article XXVI 5(c) and acceded to the 
GATT
7. Table 4 lists the countries acceding by Article XXVI 5(c) and those by normal 
procedures. In terms of changes in economic performance before and after accessions, the 
two groups differ considerably. As shown below, accessions seem to have much stronger 
                                                 
6 The full text of Article XXVI 5 (c) is as follows: “If any of the customs territories, in 
respect of which a contracting party has accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full 
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement, such territory shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration 
by the responsible contracting party establishing the above-mentioned fact, be deemed to be a 
contracting party.” 
7 Cambodia and Algeria were the only two countries that were eligible for Article XXVI 5(c) 
but did not use it. Both were reluctant to ask France to sponsor their accessions – a 
requirement for invoking Article XXVI.   - 12 - 
impacts on the non-Article XXVI 5(c) countries than on the others. The comparison is 
between annual growth (or private investment/GDP) averaging over zero to two years after 
accession and annual growth averaging over eight years before accession, after controlling 
for year fixed effects. 
 
Share of acceding countries growing faster after the accession than before: 
  Grew Faster than Before 
Non-Article XXVI5c Countries  72% (18/25) 
Article XXVI5c Countries  47% (8/17) 
 
Share of acceding countries investing more output after accession than before: 
  Invested More than Before 
Non-Article XXVI5c Countries  59% (13/22) 
Article XXVI5c Countries  38% (6/16) 
 
Further summary statistics of ArticleXXVI5(c) and non-ArticleXXVI5(c) countries 
before and after accession are reported in the second and third columns of Table 2. In 
particular, notice that the pre-accession growth behaviors between the two groups of 
countries are quite similar (the difference in the mean of their pre-accession growth is not 
statistically significant at 5 percent level); but the average post-accession growth of the non-
Article XXVI 5(c) countries is significantly faster than that of the Article XXVI 5(c) 
countries. In view of the heterogeneity, we perform the same regressions as are reported in 
Figures 1 and 2 and Table 3, except that we now use dummies to separate the set of countries 
acceded to the world trade body through Article XXVI 5(c) from the rest. The results on 
growth and investment are plotted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. In contrast with the 
results for the whole sample, non-Article XXVI 5(c) countries grow significantly faster than 
before ever since one year before accession. The growth performance of non-Article XXVI 
5(c) countries is generally stronger than that of the Article XXVI 5(c) countries. Moreover, 
the accession effect on growth seems longer-lasting. Its economic and statistical significance 
persists even beyond the fifth year after accession.
8 On the other hand, accessions have only 
                                                 
8 Countries that were not eligible for Article XXVI 5(c) acceded by either GATT Article 
XXXIII (mostly before 1995) or Marrakesh Article XII (mostly after 1995). In a regression 
(continued…)   - 13 - 
very weak effects, if at all, on the Article XXVI 5(c) countries. For instance, in the second 
year after accession, the Article XXVI 5(c) countries grew only 0.8 percentage points faster 
than before, and it is not statistically different from zero.
9 
Distinction between the two groups is also apparent in Figure 4. Compared with 
before, non-Article XXVI 5(c) countries invested more of their output than before, relative to 
other countries. For example, in the third year after accession, this group of countries on 
average increased their investment/GDP ratio by about 18 percent from before. In contrast, 
Article XXVI 5(c) countries on average increased their investment/GDP ratio by only 3 
percent from before in year 3 post-accession, and this increase is not statistically 
significant.
10 The results suggest that the extensive policy commitments a government has to 
make before accession appear to play an important role in raising output and investment. The 
regressions are also reported in details in Table 5. Ten outlying control-group countries are 
excluded from the first two columns, while no outlying countries are excluded in the last two 
columns. The two sets of results are basically identical.  
As shown by Sala-i-Martin and others (2004), some variables are robustly correlated 
with growth. These variables include investment price, fraction of GDP in mining, 
government consumption share and real exchange rate.
11 In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we 
re-run our growth regression but with these variables added in as control variables. Although 
not shown to be robustly related to growth in Sala-i-Martin and others (2004), we also 
                                                                                                                                                       
not reported here, we find that there is no statistically significant difference in post-accession 
performance between these two groups of non-Article XXVI 5(c) countries. 
9 The robust variances of the corresponding coefficient estimates are 0.000077 and 0.000170, 
respectively, and their robust covariance is –0.000076. The robust t-statistic of the sum is 
0.82 (i.e., 0.008/(0.000077+0.000170-2*0.000076)^0.5). 
10 The robust variances of the corresponding coefficient estimates are 0.006 and 0.021, 
respectively, and their robust covariance is –0.006. The robust t-statistic of the sum is 0.23 
(i.e., 0.028/(0.006+0.021-2*0.006)^0.5). 
11 While there are other variables that are shown to be robustly correlated with growth in 
Sala-i-Martin and others (2004), they vary little over time, and their effects are already 
mostly captured by the country fixed effects, which are included in our regressions.    - 14 - 
include revolution dummies, coup dummies and cabinet change dummies on the right hand 
side to capture social and political spillovers to the economy.
12 The first column of Table 6 
restates the results from the first column of Table 5 for ease of comparison. As shown in 
column 2 of Table 6, our results—both the coefficient estimates and their significance 
level—are basically unchanged with the inclusion of the revolution, coup, and cabinet change 
dummies, although each of these additional control variables is statistically significant. Next, 
in column 3, we include also the four variables motivated by Sala-i-Martin and others (2004). 
While the coefficient estimates are somewhat lowered, in a sense it is not surprising since 
these four additional control variables are each likely to be affected by WTO/GATT 
accessions. We should also note that most of the coefficient estimates on the accession time 
profile still remain statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Lastly, in column 4, we 
also control for changes in the total trade to GDP ratio. Although the coefficient estimates are 
reduced further, the statistical significance of most of them still remain above 10 percent 
level. The result suggests that WTO/GATT accessions might affect a country’s growth 
through affecting its trade volume, but this is not the only channel. 
 
3. THE SELECTION ISSUE AND OTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
One might cast doubt on the exogeneity of accessions. In particular, do our results for 
the non-Article XXVI 5(c) countries simply reflect the possibility that countries more likely 
to experience stronger future growth anyway self-select to accede to WTO/GATT? In this 
section, we tackle this issue with economic as well as statistical arguments. 
 
3.A.  The Gap between Applications and Accessions 
We exploit the long and variable lag between the dates of application and the dates of actual 
accession. Suppose the concern is that only pro-growth governments would apply for WTO 
                                                 
12 Revolution, coup, and cabinet change dummies denote, respectively, whether there are 
revolutions, coups, and change in premier or 50 percent of the government cabinet happening 
in the country in a particular year. Source: Banks Cross-National Time-Series Archive.    - 15 - 
membership, then the change in the growth rate associated with the event of application 
would capture this “observed government type” effect. We can then investigate if there is any 
additional increment in the growth rate around the time of actual accession after taking into 
account whatever happens around the time of application.  The results on growth and 
investment are reported in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. As the figures show, there is indeed 
an increase in growth and the investment/GDP ratio in the two to four years after application, 
and this might be associated with the government’s pursuit of various reforms that might or 
might not be related to WTO/GATT accession. However, from that point on the 
improvement dies down as time progresses. Most interestingly, the positive effects pick up 
again as the country approaches the time of accession. The coefficient estimates are also 
reported in Table 7. These results strongly suggest that accessions make independent 
contributions in encouraging investment and raising output.
  
Alternatively, one might proxy for the political difficulty the government faces in 
carrying out unilateral reforms (and thus its likelihood of carrying out pro-growth reforms 
independent of the accession) by the time length of negotiations with the Working Party. 
Presumably, the stronger the resistance the interest groups put up against reforms, the less 
likely the government has enough support to accept the Working Party’s terms, thus the 
lengthier the negotiations would become. However, we do not find any significant 
relationship between length of negotiations and growth. In any case, inclusion of this variable 
does not alter the qualitative aspect of our results (not reported to save space). This seems to 
validate the independent effects of accession. 
Separating the timing of application and that of actual accession also helps address 
another endogeneity concern:  a government might choose to join the WTO/GATT only 
when it is more politically expedient to do so (e.g., during an economic upturn). Anecdotal 
observations suggest, however, that there is generally a long and uncertain gap between the 
date of WTO membership application and the date of actual accession. Although a 
government might well strategically time its application to the WTO, the actual accession 
date is often driven mostly by the politics and economics of the Working Party members 
instead. Take the Chinese WTO application as an example. While the timing of the initial 
application might reflect domestic politics in China, the timing of the eventual accession was   - 16 - 
largely driven by Mexico, the last Working Party member to sign a bilateral agreement with 
China. Similarly, for the Russian WTO application, while the timing of the initial application 
has to do with politics in Russia, the date of final accession is mostly controlled by the 
United States, the last country in the Working Party to sign a bilateral agreement. In other 
words, the timing of the actual accession is less likely to be driven by the business cycle and 
politics of the applicant country. For the purpose of dealing with the interpretation of 
strategic timing of joining the WTO/GATT, we can make the extreme assumption that all the 
positive growth effect at the time of initial application reflects the endogenous nature of the 
application (which is likely to be an overkill). Conditional on the effect of application, we 
would argue that the positive growth effect of the eventual accession is less likely a result of 
domestic politics and business cycle features of the accession country. 
The Heckman approach discussed below is another attempt to net out the effects of 
strategic timing by the accession countries. As panel (and not only cross-country) data are 
utilized, the strategic timing factors can be captured in our econometric setup. 
 
3.B. Testing for Selection Bias with Heckman Procedure 
To the extent that WTO/GATT membership status might not be strictly exogenous, it 
is possible that our results are biased by some unobserved or omitted variables that affect 
both the membership status and changes in the countries’ economic performance. To see 
whether this is the case, we employ a two-step procedure pioneered by Heckman (1979) with 
modifications tailored for panel data as suggested by Wooldridge (1995). Specifically, we 
first carry out a probit regression estimating the WTO/GATT membership status of a country 
(member or nonmember) as a function of observable country features (the country’s lagged 
log per capita GDP and lagged log trade to GDP ratio). The choice of the independent 
variables is guided by the theoretical literature on the benefits of WTO/GATT membership 
(as commitment to trade liberalization: e.g., Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998 and 2007; as 
neutralization of terms-of-trade effects: e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1999)—please see the 
appendix for more discussion. Then for each country-year observation we compute the 
inverse Mills ratio, which contains information about the unobserved factors that also affect 
the country’s membership status in that particular year. In the second stage, we add in the   - 17 - 
inverse Mills ratio as an independent variable in our estimation of growth or investment 
regressions. The inclusion of the ratio is supposed to control for the effects of the unobserved 
factors from the first stage on the dependent variable in the second stage, thus ensuring that 
the coefficient estimates in the second stage are purged of biases resulting from the 
endogenous nature of membership status. On the other hand, if selection bias is absent – i.e., 
the dependent variable in the second stage is not affected by the unobserved factors affecting 
the membership status – the coefficient estimate of the inverse Mills ratio would not be 
statistically significantly different from zero. In such a case, our original specification would 
have little bias, and our benchmark results would be valid. 
The tests of the selection bias are presented in Table 8. In the growth and investment 
regressions in columns 1 and 2 (for which lagged GDP, lagged trade/GDP, lagged, and 
lagged proxies for constraint on government executive power and for political tie with the US 
are included as the first-stage independent variables) and in columns 3 and 4 (for which 
lagged average statutory tariff imposed on imports is included as an additional first-stage 
independent variable), the coefficient estimates of the inverse Mills ratio are all statistically 
insignificant (the p-values are 0.18, 0.30, 0.46, and 0.53, respectively). Therefore, there is no 
evidence of a quantitatively significant amount of selection bias present. This is perhaps not 
surprising because all recent accession cases (except those that were able to invoke Article 
XXVI 5(c)) involve substantial policy changes that the countries would not have embarked 
on if they had been left alone. In any case, as Table 8 shows, when we include the inverse 
Mills ratio from the selection equation, accessions still appear to have significant positive 
impacts on growth and investment.  
Subsample for which the error term in the selection equation is normally distributed. 
In usual instrumental variable regressions, it is absolutely necessary for instruments to 
satisfy relevant exclusion restrictions. While one or more of our first-stage independent 
variables (e.g., degree of checks and balance in the government, UN voting record) might 
qualify as an excluded variable, one useful statistical property associated with the Heckman 
selection procedure—different from instrumental variable regressions—is that identification 
can also be achieved through the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio in the second stage if   - 18 - 
the error term in the first stage probit regression follows a normal distribution.
13 We now 
seek to take advantage of this property.  
We perform a Lagrange multiplier test proposed by Bera, Jarque, and Lee (1984) to 
our first-stage probit. The null of this test is that the error term is normally distributed, and 
the test statistics follow chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom (for which the 
critical value at the 10 percent rejection level is 4.61). For regressions 2-4, the null is not 
rejected, thus supporting the assumption that the error terms in the first-stage probit 
regressions are normally distributed. While the normality assumption is rejected for the full 
sample (2,166 observations used in regression 1,), it is not rejected for the sub-sample (1,832 
observations) for which we have private investment data (i.e., the sample for regression 2). 
Specifically, the p-value of the Bera-Jarque-Lee test statistics is 0.64 for the subsample. We 
rerun our selection-test procedures for growth, but now based on the subsample for which the 
first-stage error term can be argued to be normally distributed. The results are reported in 
column 5 of Table 8. The coefficient estimates on the accession time profile and the Article 
XXVI 5(c) interaction terms in column 5 are similar to those in columns 1. Equally 
interesting, in neither of the two columns is the coefficient estimate on the inverse Mills ratio 
statistically significant.
14 
3.C.   Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups 
One might think that prior to accessions there is maybe intrinsic difference between the 
structures of growth paths followed by the treatment group (i.e., the acceding countries) and 
the control group (i.e., the nonacceding countries), thus rendering the comparison of growth 
performance between the two groups inappropriate. To assess this concern, we test whether 
                                                 
13 The procedure, however, makes no assumption about the distribution of the error term in 
the second stage (see Wooldridge, 1995). 
14 For all the specifications in columns 1-5 of Table 8, essentially the same results obtain if 
we instead jointly estimate the selection and main regressions with the maximum likelihood 
method (results not reported to save space).   - 19 - 
the residuals of the growth regression (controlling for log of lagged GDP per capita, year 
fixed effects, and country fixed effects) for the treatment-group countries at least 3 years 
prior to their accessions and those for the control-group countries appear to be similarly 
distributed. There are 152 and 1,272 observations from which the residuals for the treatment 
group and control group are computed, respectively. We find that the means of residuals for 
the two groups are both essentially zero. The standard deviation of the treatment-group 
residuals is 0.07 while that of the control-group residuals is 0.06. We also perform a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distributions of the residuals. The p-vale of the test is 0.14, 
and thus one cannot reject the null that the two sets of residuals are drawn from the same 
distribution. In other words, after taking account of the control in our growth-regression 
specification, the growth behaviors of the acceding countries prior to their accessions appear 
to be similar to those of the non-acceding countries. Therefore, our results are unlikely to be 
attributed to the accession countries’ ex ante difference from the control-group countries. 
 
3.D.   Transition  Economies 
There are 14 transition economies in our sample of 25 non-Article XXVI 5(c) 
countries.
15 There is a possibility that the transition economies are different from other 
developing countries. We separately track the effects of WTO accessions for transition and 
non-transition economies in Table 9, Panel A, by adding a dummy, TE, and its interactions 
with a sequence of time dummies.  In this specification, the first half of the coefficients 
describes the growth trajectory after WTO membership for non-transition economies. It can 
be seen that there is a statistically significant increase in growth rates in the first two years 
following accession. Therefore, at least some of the positive growth effects of WTO 
membership are independent from the transition economies. The results on private 
investment (column 3) are somewhat weaker -- the coefficient estimates are positive and 
statistically significant only in year 4 (and “beyond”).  
                                                 
15 The 14 transition economies are Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, China, Croatia, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Slovak and Slovenia.   - 20 - 
The second part of the coefficients tracks the growth effects of WTO membership for 
the transition economies. Judged by both the point estimates and the t-statistics, these effects 
tend to be larger and more significant than their counterparts for non-transition economies. 
We do not think these positive growth effects simply reflect an economic rebound in the 
early stage of the transition. After the collapse of communist regime in 1990-91, most 
transition countries applied for GATT membership in 1993-94. However, they did not 
become members until an average of 5.6 years after their applications (see Table 1 for more 
information), or 8.7 years after their political regime change. Such a long interval renders it 
unlikely that the direct effects of regime change account for the increases in their growth and 
investment around the time of WTO accessions. Moreover, while the political regime change 
in these countries happened around the same time, their dates of WTO/GATT accession vary 
widely between 1994 and 2001. Note also Hungary, Poland, and Romania acquired their 
GATT membership before 1990, and therefore are part of the control group. 
On the other hand, the growth effects of the transition economies could partly reflect 
the consequence of a large number of economic agreements between these economies and 
the European Union (e.g., Europe Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, 
TCECA, Stabilization and Association Agreements, EU application) (mostly signed between 
1993 and 1996). While it is difficult to isolate the effect of WTO accessions from that of the 
EU agreements for these countries, the general idea that external treaties could enhance the 
commitment ability of these governments is still valid. 
In Part B of Table 9, we focus only on non-transition economies and compare their 
average economic performance 8 years before accession relative to that 3 years after 
accession (the sample becomes too short if we go beyond three years). Although the results 
on investment are weaker, we find significant improvement in the countries’ growth rates 
after accession. This again confirms the conclusion that the positive growth effects of WTO 
membership is not unique to transition economies. 
 
3.E. Consistency of Estimates 
Since our data do not have long time series, our panel fixed-effect estimates are 
potentially inconsistent. In particular, in the growth regression, the log of lagged per capita   - 21 - 
GDP regressor might be endogenous. To check if this could bias our result, we adopt a two-
step procedure. In step one, we use Blundell and Bond’s system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) to estimate the following relationship
16 
 
,, 0 1 ,, log( ) , its t i t its G GDP per capita β ββε − =+ + +  
 
based on a sub-sample of non-acceding countries. The estimated 
^
0 β is consistent and equal 
to -0.21 for our sample. In step two, we impose the estimate on our original growth 
regression to estimate  s β -- the coefficients on the time-profile of accession. The results are 
reported in the column 2 of part A of Table 9. Although the 
^
0 β  based on Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimation is different from that in the panel fixed-effect estimation, the coefficient 
estimates on the time-profile of accession and its interaction with the transition-economy 
dummy are virtually unaffected. There continue to be positive and significant pickups in 
growth even for non-transition economies during the first two years after accession. 
Moreover, the residuals from step two (with the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimate of  0 β  
imposed on the growth regression) for the control group and the treatment group for the pre-
accession years continue to appear to be similarly distributed. The p-value of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.32, indicating little evidence that the two sets of residuals are 
differently distributed. 
As a final thought for this section, commitments made under accession negotiations 
should in any case be recognized as important and critical elements of any possible wider 
reforms an acceding country is undertaking. The protracted and complex accession process is 
often a result of certain interest groups’ unwillingness to concede to the Working Party’s 
original policy demands and the subsequent lengthy negotiations between the two parties that 
involve substantial give-and-take. In other words, if left to its own devices, it is not likely that 
                                                 
16 We thank a referee for pointing out that Blundell and Bond’s GMM method is more 
appropriate than Arellano and Bond (1991) for samples that have small time dimension.   - 22 - 
the government can overcome the anti-reform resistance to engage in those policy changes 
prescribed in the WTO/GATT agreement. Besides, other elements of reforms the acceding 
government may like to pursue on its own but are not required by the accession may hinge on 
the success of accession negotiations. For instance, the government may use as currency the 
increased export opportunities conferred by the WTO/GATT membership to buy political 
support from interest groups that would otherwise resist those elements of reforms. Therefore, 
WTO/GATT accession should be viewed as at least an enabler, if not the fundamental cause, of 
the pro-growth reforms carried out by the acceding governments. 
 
4. IS EXTERNAL COMMITMENT A PARTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR BETTER GOVERNANCE? 
Poor public governance including corruption and deviation from rule of law appears 
to inhibit economic development in many countries. We now examine the interactions 
between policy commitments made under WTO accessions and the quality of a country’s 
public governance. Ex ante, there are two opposing possibilities. The first hypothesis posits 
that poor-governance countries benefit more from the external commitment. These countries 
are least likely to enact and carry through reforms unilaterally. So the external commitment 
can induce them to do more than they otherwise would have. On the opposite side, a second 
possibility is that the countries with weak governance may have lower capacity to carry out 
any given reform commitments in the accession agreement. Which of the two possibilities 
dominates is an interesting empirical question. 
We focus on the 15 countries that have joined the WTO since 1995 in order to take 
advantage of the standardized format of the Working Party reports that list the reform 
commitments of these countries.
17  The summary statistics on growth, investment and trade 
before and after accession for this group of countries are shown in the last column of Table 2. 
                                                 
17 When we redo the earlier regressions with only the treatment group restricted to these 15 
countries, we find that the results are broadly similar to our earlier findings for the non-
Article XXVI5c countries.  
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Upon receiving an application for the WTO membership, a Working Party composed 
of any interested existing members is formed to negotiate with the government a series of 
commitments, which broadly fall into two categories. One is market-access commitments 
that dictate the extent to which the domestic markets for goods and services are open to other 
WTO members. The other type of commitments concerns the government’s other internal 
policies that may be trade-related but may also have considerable impacts on many other 
economic fronts. These commitments cover a wide range of topics. For instance, a country 
might be required to commit to 1) not restrict any private firms’ ability to import or export, 2) 
make transparent its future privatization plans, 3) refrain from providing certain subsidies, 4) 
abort state trading, 5) eliminate price controls, etc. A recent report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office commented that “China also has made a substantial number of 
important, specific commitments [in WTO accession negotiations] in the rule of law-related 
areas of transparency, judicial review, uniform enforcement of legal measures, and 
nondiscrimination in its commercial policy” (GAO-05-53, 2004). Drabek (1996) discusses 
how the commitments required for accessions might improve productivity and efficiency 
generally, rather than just in the trade area, in transition economies. Table 10 lists examples 
of policy commitments that likely have important implications for investment and growth. 
These commitments are explicitly incorporated in the Protocol as an integral part of 
the formal accession agreement enforceable through WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism – 
unlike other statements made in a Working Party Report not reproduced in the Protocol, the 
stated commitments are legally binding. For example, in 2004 the United States filed a 
complaint with the WTO’s dispute settlement body against China, arguing that its differential 
value-added tax treatment of integrated-circuits manufacturers violated the terms of its 
accession Protocol (WT/DS309). China in the end had to agree to stop providing VAT 
rebates to the domestic producers.  
 
Policy commitments and governance quality 
The standardized format of the Working Party Reports in the WTO era ensures that 
every commitment item is clearly stated in the documents across the various acceding 
countries. Each single commitment pinpoints one particular area of policy. We adopt a   - 24 - 
simple and transparent approach by counting the total number of commitments mentioned in 
the Working Party Report as our proxy for the degree of a country’s external commitment. 
Although it is by no means ideal, this measure is likely to embed a considerable amount of 
information about the order of the countries in terms of how stringent the policy 
requirements they were subject to.
18 By this metric, there is substantial variability in the 
degree of commitment among the accession countries. There is not a single, one-size-fits-all 
set of commitments applied to every country seeking accession. The first column of Table 11 
presents the number of commitments made by the 15 countries in our treatment sample.  
We proxy for a country’s governance quality with the earliest edition (1996-97 
edition) of World Bank’s Governance Matters indices (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
2005), which are based on 32 data sources compiled by 30 different organizations. For our 
purpose, we pick two of the indices’ six dimensions that appear to be the most relevant to 
investment decisions and most likely to be areas that the accession negotiations focus on. 
They are “Regulatory Burden”—measuring incidence of market-unfriendly policies, and 
“Rule of Law”— measuring the quality of contract enforcement.
19 We will refer to 3 plus the 
sum of a country’s indices in the two dimensions as the country’s governance index. The 
higher the score, the better the governance quality is. The second column of Table 11 lists the 
governance index for our treatment sample. 
Average effects of commitments are shown in Table 12.
20 China is an outlier with 
147 commitments compared with a median of 27. The results on growth from the sample 
                                                 
18 Ex post evaluation of how closely each country observes its accession commitments would 
have provided another relevant measure. However, no appropriate data source exists. The 
documents that resemble the most such evaluation – Trade Policy Reviews published by the 
WTO Secretariat – primarily focus on clarifying rather than evaluating the countries’ trade 
policies. Our discussion with WTO staff convinced us that these documents do not serve the 
purpose as a check list on which commitments are met and which are not. 
19 The other dimensions are: “Voice and Accountability,” “Political Instability and 
Violence,” “Government Effectiveness,” and “Control of Corruption.” 
20 Data on private investment is available for fewer countries than total investment is. Given 
our relatively small treatment sample, we use total investment as our investment measure. 
Generally, however, the coefficient estimates of the regressions with private investment and 
those with total investment are remarkably similar. 
(continued…)   - 25 - 
excluding China are in the first column. The coefficient estimates on our policy commitment 
variable are all positive, and those on years -2, -1, 2, and 3 are statistically significant at the 
10 percent level (or better). In the second column of the table, we convert our commitment 
variable into a binary variable, and continue to find positive effects of commitments on 
growth. Also, commitments seem to have broadly positive effect on the acceding country’s 
investment to GDP ratio (the last two columns of Table 12), although the estimates are not 
statistically significant.  
 
Differential effects of policy commitments 
To test the idea that external commitments may be a partial substitute for quality of 
governance, we check how the effects of  policy commitments on a country’s growth vary 
with the country’s governance quality.  We multiply the time profiles of accessions with the 
interaction terms of our measure of policy commitments and the governance index. The 
results, presented in the first and second columns of Tables 13, give support to the 
“substitute” hypothesis. The coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are significantly 
negative in both regressions, suggesting the positive effects of policy commitments are 
stronger among poor-governance countries.
21 
For further robustness check, we impose a binary structure on our commitment and 
governance variables. The small sample renders complete (2-by-2) categorization by these 
two variables infeasible; instead we separate the countries into three different groups. 
Countries with governance index above 3, which corresponds to the mean of all countries, 
are called “Good Governance” and the rest are called “Poor Governance” countries. Within 
the “Poor Governance” group, any countries that have more than 27 commitments (median of 
the sample) are called “Many Commitments,” and the rest “Few Commitments.” By this 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
21 Our results also hold when we use other measures of governance, namely Doing Business 
index of legal rights and Heritage Foundation index of overall economic freedom.    - 26 - 
categorization, we have five countries in the (Poor Governance, Many Commitments), four 
in the (Poor Governance, Few Commitments) and six in the (Good Governance) groups.  
The last two columns of Table 13 report the results. The (Poor Governance, Many 
Commitments) group is the benchmark group. Collaborating with the previous results, those 
with fewer commitments generally did not have as strong a pickup in economic performance 
as those with more commitments. Confirming the differential impacts of policy 
commitments, we find (though do not report) that among the good-governance countries, 
those with most commitments (Jordan and Lithuania) showed smaller improvement in 
growth and investment to GDP ratio than those with fewest commitments (Latvia, Panama 
and Estonia).
22  
Overall, these results on the differential effects of policy commitments not only 
suggest their positive causal consequences, but also lend support to the view that the policy 
changes imposed by a third party particularly benefit countries with poor governance – they 
appear to be partial substitute for good governance. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Using WTO accessions as a case study, this paper investigates the value of making 
policy reform commitments externally. Some developing countries were eligible to obtain 
membership without serious reforms; most others would have to undertake wide-ranging 
policy changes that go beyond narrowly defined trade areas, including competition policy, 
price controls, investment policy, privatization plans, and transparency requirement.  
Our empirical results show that WTO/GATT accessions are often associated with 
significant increases in growth and investment that last for about five years, but the effects 
work only for those countries that have to undertake substantial reforms (i.e., not eligible for 
Article XXVI 5(c). While the pickup in the growth rates is only temporary (five years after 
accession), the economy is permanently larger (by 20%) as a result. We also find that the 
                                                 
22 Similar results obtain when we alternatively use the number of words contained in the 
Working Party Reports as the proxy for the degree of policy commitment.   - 27 - 
beneficial effects of policy commitments seem more pronounced among countries with 
poorer governance. This suggests that binding policy changes enforced by a credible third 
party (WTO) serve as a (partial) substitute for good governance in promoting economic 
development. By utilizing the gap between the dates of application and actual accession as 
well as implementing a statistical procedure to correct for a selection bias, we conclude that 
the WTO/GATT benefits are unlikely to be caused by an endogenous selection bias.  
  In contrast to Barro and Lee (2005), who find no pro-growth effect of IMF supported 
programs, we have identified beneficial effects of reforms induced by WTO accessions. One 
conjecture is that policy commitments under WTO accessions are longer-lasting. Future 
research could examine this formally in order to understand why external commitment works 
in some context but not in others..   
For lack of good measures of individual reforms, this paper focuses on the overall 
effects of the package of policy changes, instead of attempting to isolate individual reforms 
that seem most important. Also, due to time-series limitation on the data, our analyses can 
only focus on a timeframe around the accessions in recent years. We are not able to 
distinguish a level effect from a growth effect. It would be interesting for future research to 
measure the longer-term effects of policy commitments on economic development for a 
larger sample of countries.    - 28 - 
Appendix 
The choice of independent variables for first-stage regressions in the Heckman procedure is 
guided by the theoretical literature on the benefits of WTO/GATT membership. We identify 
the following variables/proxies that, according to the literature, should affect the likelihood 
of a country being committed to trade liberalization via WTO/GATT membership. 
 
a)  Government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis protected industries (Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare, 1998).  
We proxy it with the “checks” variable from the World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions. It measures the concentration of executive power. Presumably, the less 
concentrated the power, the less able the government can extract rent from protected 
industries. 
b)  Mobility of resources across sectors (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998).  
Existing data on the direct measures of the flexibility of factor markets within a country 
(e.g., World Bank’s Doing Business), unfortunately, neither go as far back as the beginning 
year of our sample period nor able to capture much time variation necessary for our panel-
data setting. We therefore use an “outcome” measure—the country’s ex-ante trade 
openness—to proxy this. To the extent that the government is more willing to open to trade if 
resources in the economy can more flexibly move across sectors in response to external 
shocks, the degree of the country’s ex-ante trade openness contains information about the 
mobility of its resources. We also note that being relatively open to trade does not necessarily 
imply little need for commitment through WTO to trade liberalization. Even if a country is 
relatively open to trade ex ante, it is still very well possible that the government is unable to 
commit to trade liberalization for certain industries. WTO membership, on the other hand, 
typically entails sweeping trade reforms across almost all industries, hence committing the 
government to trade liberalization for even the industries that it would not have opened up to 
trade has it not joined the WTO. 
c)  Room for the government to grant protection ex post (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2007).  
We do not have a satisfactory measure for this. We proxy it with the country’s apparent 
political tie with the US reflected in the UN voting records. The idea is the more closely tied 
the country is with the US (the biggest importer and arguably the most powerful member of 
WTO) in the political domain, the less likely that WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism 
would be invoked against it if it does not perfectly follow WTO’s rules, and thus the more 
room it has to grant protection even after joining WTO. 
 
d)  Size of the potential negative terms-of-trade effects of unilateral liberalization (Bagwell 
and Staiger, 1999).    - 29 - 
As the literature suggests (e.g., Broda, Limao and Weinstein, 2007), observed tariffs 
imposed by countries that are unconstrained by WTO are in line with “optimal” tariffs, which 
reflect the size of the potential terms-of-trade effects that the country face. We proxy it with 
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2000 Albania              1965 Gambia, The          1997 Panama              
#1994 Angola               2000 Georgia              #1994 Papua New Guinea    
1987 Antigua and Barbuda  1957 Ghana                1994 Paraguay            
1967 Argentina #1994 Grenada              1951 Peru
@ Azerbaijan, Rep. of 1991 Guatemala            1979 Philippines
@ Bahamas, The         #1994 Guinea               1967 Poland              
#1993 Bahrain, Kingdom of #1994 Guinea-Bissau        1971 Romania
1972 Bangladesh           1966 Guyana               @ Russia
1967 Barbados             1950 Haiti                1966 Rwanda              
@ Belarus 1994 Honduras             @ Samoa
1983 Belize               1973 Hungary              @ São Tomé & Príncipe
@ Bhutan               1948 India 1963 Senegal
1990 Bolivia              1962 Israel               @ Seychelles
1987 Botswana             1963 Jamaica              1961 Sierra Leone        
1948 Brazil 2000 Jordan 1973 Singapore           
1996 Bulgaria             @ Kazakhstan           1993 Slovak Republic     
1965 Burundi              1964 Kenya                1994 Slovenia
@ Cambodia             @ Kiribati             #1994 Solomon Islands     
1963 Cameroon             1967 Korea 1948 South Africa
@ Cape Verde           1998 Kyrgyz Republic      1948 Sri Lanka
1963 Central African Rep. @ Lao People's Dem.Rep #1994 St. Kitts and Nevis 
1963 Chad                 1999 Latvia               #1993 St. Lucia           
1949 Chile 1988 Lesotho              #1993 St. Vincent & Grens.
2001 China,P.R.: Mainland @ Liberia              @ Sudan
1986 China,P.R.:Hong Kong 2001 Lithuania            1978 Suriname
1981 Colombia @ Macedonia, FYR #1993 Swaziland           
1971 Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1963 Madagascar @ Syrian Arab Republic
1963 Congo, Republic of 1964 Malawi               @ Tajikistan
1990 Costa Rica           1957 Malaysia             1961 Tanzania            
1963 Côte d'Ivoire        1983 Maldives             1982 Thailand
2000 Croatia #1993 Mali                 1964 Togo                
1948 Cuba 1964 Malta                @ Tonga               
1963 Cyprus               1963 Mauritania           1962 Trinidad and Tobago
1993 Czech Republic 1970 Mauritius 1990 Tunisia
#1994 Djibouti             1986 Mexico 1951 Turkey
#1993 Dominica             2001 Moldova              @ Turkmenistan        
1950 Dominican Republic 1997 Mongolia             1962 Uganda              
1996 Ecuador 1987 Morocco              @ Ukraine
1970 Egypt                #1992 Mozambique           1953 Uruguay
1991 El Salvador          #1992 Namibia              @ Uzbekistan          
@ Equatorial Guinea    @ Nepal @ Vanuatu             
1999 Estonia              1950 Nicaragua            @ Vietnam
@ Ethiopia             1963 Niger                @ Yemen Arab Rep.
#1993 Fiji                 2000 Oman                 1982 Zambia
1963 Gabon                1948 Pakistan 1948 Zimbabwe
Note:
#  Denotes countries acceding to the GATT by Article XXVI 5(c) between 1990 and 1994
@ Denotes countries which never joined GATT/WTO before 2001
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.111 -4.58 -0.082 -4.70
s =  -2 0.009 0.90 0.046 0.66 0.011 0.91 0.031 0.33
-1 0.025 2.51 0.044 0.69 0.022 2.53 0.034 0.56
0 0.019 2.59 0.026 0.39 0.024 2.66 0.012 0.16
1 0.025 3.66 0.051 0.81 0.025 3.79 0.031 0.48
2 0.031 4.79 0.075 1.12 0.033 4.55 0.057 0.91
3 0.016 1.96 0.107 1.40 0.014 1.64 0.096 1.21
4 -0.001 -0.14 0.058 0.75 -0.005 -0.34 0.044 0.55
5 0.014 1.85 -0.011 -0.18 0.012 1.62 -0.018 -0.25





"Treatment" group: Countries acceding between 1990 and 2001
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Note: Regressions 1 and 2 exclude 10 outliers from the control group;
        regressions 3 and 4 do not exclude any outliers from the control group.
Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.031 -5.42
s =  -2 0.022 1.55 0.048 0.46
-1 0.016 1.61 -0.045 -0.41
0 0.013 1.18 -0.163 -1.35
1 0.026 1.57 -0.034 -0.33
2 0.023 1.59 0.045 0.47
3 0.010 1.23 0.103 1.08
4 0.002 0.24 0.151 1.57
5 0.007 0.72 0.079 0.81





"Treatment" group: Countries acceding between 1955 and 1989 (44 countries acceded during the period); 
"Control" group: All other developing countries 
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Note: Regressions exclude 10 outliers from the control group
0.12 0.56






Annual Growth Rate Log(Pri Inv/GDP)
12
Table 3A. Changes in Growth and Investment Around Accessions:
0.19 0.54
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.104 -4.31 -0.088 -4.44
s =  -2 0.007 0.54 0.011 0.17 0.008 0.59 0.009 0.14
-1 0.022 3.14 0.062 1.02 0.026 3.23 0.071 1.12
0 0.024 2.81 0.085 1.45 0.029 2.72 0.090 1.51
1 0.039 4.54 0.094 1.46 0.049 4.95 0.091 1.41
2 0.042 5.31 0.132 1.98 0.051 5.42 0.131 1.92
3 0.033 3.35 0.184 2.35 0.035 3.31 0.179 2.26
4 0.026 3.13 0.161 2.49 0.028 3.13 0.160 2.41
5 0.022 2.49 0.102 1.50 0.020 2.23 0.103 1.46
beyond 0.017 3.06 0.152 2.70 0.017 2.92 0.161 2.83
s*AXXVI5c Dummy: -2 * AXXVI5c 0.006 0.31 0.083 0.62 0.007 0.37 0.053 0.44
-1 * AXXVI5c -0.008 -0.32 -0.035 -0.26 -0.007 -0.32 -0.070 -0.54
-0 * AXXVI5c -0.010 -0.81 -0.157 -1.11 -0.015 -0.87 -0.192 -1.39
1 * AXXVI5c -0.045 -3.31 -0.113 -0.93 -0.046 -3.39 -0.132 -1.08
2 * AXXVI5c -0.034 -3.11 -0.151 -1.14 -0.036 -3.07 -0.175 -1.41
3 * AXXVI5c -0.047 -3.57 -0.158 -1.21 -0.053 -3.78 -0.188 -1.41
4 * AXXVI5c -0.059 -3.24 -0.204 -1.52 -0.066 -3.35 -0.220 -1.66
5 * AXXVI5c -0.022 -1.72 -0.228 -1.81 -0.021 -1.70 -0.231 -1.83





"Treatment" group: Countries acceding between 1990 and 2001
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Note: Regressions 3 and 4 do not exlcude 10 outliers from the control group.
4
Y
Table 5. Changes in Growth, Investment and Trade: Article XXVI 5(c) vs. Non-Article XXVI 5(c) Countries
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.104 -4.31 -0.122 -8.21 -0.117 -7.77 -0.121 -8.09
s =  -2 0.007 0.54 0.012 1.01 0.008 0.51 0.004 0.21
-1 0.022 3.14 0.029 3.22 0.024 2.72 0.017 2.05
0 0.024 2.81 0.028 2.53 0.017 1.99 0.015 1.32
1 0.039 4.54 0.040 4.13 0.032 3.52 0.027 2.68
2 0.042 5.31 0.040 4.71 0.033 4.13 0.029 3.31
3 0.033 3.35 0.035 2.77 0.026 2.43 0.018 1.73
4 0.026 3.13 0.025 3.30 0.026 3.16 0.017 1.94
5 0.022 2.49 0.018 1.70 0.015 1.43 0.008 0.77
beyond 0.017 3.06 0.014 1.22 0.013 0.91 0.008 0.41
s*AXXVI5c Dummy: -2 * AXXVI5c 0.006 0.31 0.002 0.12 0.017 0.78 0.031 1.45
-1 * AXXVI5c -0.008 -0.32 -0.015 -0.59 -0.005 -0.23 0.006 0.19
-0 * AXXVI5c -0.010 -0.81 -0.018 -1.12 -0.008 -0.44 0.000 -0.01
1 * AXXVI5c -0.045 -3.31 -0.051 -3.38 -0.034 -1.97 -0.019 -1.15
2 * AXXVI5c -0.034 -3.11 -0.037 -2.77 -0.018 -1.03 0.003 0.23
3 * AXXVI5c -0.047 -3.57 -0.054 -3.44 -0.038 -2.55 -0.022 -1.31
4 * AXXVI5c -0.059 -3.24 -0.067 -3.31 -0.050 -2.09 -0.034 -1.28
5 * AXXVI5c -0.022 -1.72 -0.017 -0.81 0.030 0.12 0.009 1.20
beyond * AXXVI5c -0.044 -4.62 -0.035 -2.23 -0.018 -0.79 -0.003 -0.09
Revolution Dummies -0.021 -3.71 -0.019 -3.33 -0.017 -3.55
Coup Dummies -0.024 -2.23 -0.024 -1.77 -0.024 -1.61
Cabinet Change Dummies -0.008 -3.75 -0.009 -3.37 -0.009 -3.28
Share of GDP in Mining 0.140 2.12 0.133 1.97
Investment Price -0.015 -1.41 -0.014 -1.53
Government Consumption as GDP Share 0.040 0.66 0.019 0.30
Real Exchange Rate 0.026 2.00 0.039 2.90





"Treatment" group: Countries acceding between 1990 and 2001
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Table 6. Change in Growth, Controlling for Additional Control Variabes: Article XXVI 5(c) vs. Non-Article XXVI 5(c) Countries
123 4
Annual Growth Rate Annual Growth Rate Annual Growth Rate Annual Growth Rate
YYYY
YYYY
2375 2107 1678 1660
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.100 -3.78
Year from application 0 0.014 0.95 -0.004 -0.04
1 0.024 1.45 -0.003 -0.03
2 0.027 2.57 0.017 0.12
3 0.025 2.29 0.109 1.40
4 0.009 0.63 0.131 2.09
5 0.005 0.53 0.074 1.26
6 -0.001 -0.05 0.005 0.12
s =  -2 0.014 1.12 -0.030 -0.37
-1 0.030 3.52 0.006 0.09
0 0.032 3.07 0.034 0.53
1 0.051 4.51 0.057 0.78
2 0.053 5.34 0.122 1.53
3 0.044 3.50 0.154 1.69
4 0.043 3.59 0.169 1.99
5 0.035 2.82 0.108 1.21





"Treatment" group: Countries acceding by normal procedures between 1990 and 2001 
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 4 years before application
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Note: For countries that acceded to the WTO/GATT in fewer than 9 years since application,  
           for some years both application and accession time-profiles would simultaneously have non-zero dummies. 
Table 7. Changes in Growth and Investment for Non-AXXVI 5(c) Countries Around Application and Accession
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Inverse Mills ratio -0.004 -1.33 -0.046 -1.04 -0.005 -0.74 -0.014 -0.63 -0.004 -1.43
s =  -2 -0.010 -0.61 0.166 0.66 0.014 0.77 0.004 0.12 -0.006 -0.35
-1 0.006 0.84 0.167 0.67 0.028 1.69 -0.075 -0.78 0.006 0.85
0 0.007 0.79 0.157 1.49 0.034 1.91 0.009 0.20 0.009 0.83
1 0.023 3.41 0.155 1.99 0.037 2.43 0.081 1.65 0.024 3.35
2 0.023 3.56 0.141 1.96 0.026 2.29 0.050 1.54 0.022 3.45
3 0.011 1.58 0.149 2.08 0.001 0.04 0.084 1.59 0.008 1.47
4 0.005 0.71 0.109 1.85 0.012 0.70 0.104 1.20 0.004 0.64
5 -0.003 -0.44 0.073 0.42 -0.003 -0.32 -0.079 -1.09 -0.008 -0.47
beyond -0.001 -0.28 0.100 0.84 -0.003 -0.69 0.009 0.32 0.000 -0.38
s*AXXVI5c Dummy -2 * AXXVI5c 0.023 1.10 0.050 0.26 -0.042 -1.77 0.043 0.67 0.018 0.86
-1 * AXXVI5c 0.016 0.87 -0.167 -1.20 0.015 0.73 -0.031 -0.59 0.015 0.81
0 * AXXVI5c -0.015 -0.92 -0.145 -0.77 -0.020 -0.38 -0.097 -0.95 -0.016 -0.96
1 * AXXVI5c -0.034 -2.30 -0.140 -0.39 -0.020 -0.46 -0.096 -0.83 -0.034 -2.22
2 * AXXVI5c -0.008 -0.75 -0.112 -1.85 -0.014 -0.29 -0.096 -1.54 -0.006 -0.61
3 * AXXVI5c -0.024 -1.91 -0.080 -0.74 0.003 0.03 -0.068 -0.69 -0.022 -1.81
4 * AXXVI5c -0.038 -1.51 -0.112 -0.98 -0.013 -0.11 0.005 0.14 -0.037 -1.47
5 * AXXVI5c 0.014 1.23 -0.067 -0.53 0.003 0.02 0.052 0.77 0.015 1.31
beyond * AXXVI5c -0.016 -2.05 0.001 0.01 0.026 0.22 0.075 1.08 -0.012 -1.91
Country fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Bera-Jarque-Lee LM test statistics
# Observations
"Treatment" group: Countries acceding between 1990 and 2001
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Note: Regressions exclude 10 outliers from the control group;
Heckman 1st-stage independent variables: 
Regressions 1, 2 and 5: lagged GDP, lagged trade/GDP, lagged check and balance, lagged UN voting
Regressions 3-4: lagged GDP, lagged trade/GDP, lagged check and balance, lagged UN voting, lagged average tariff
Check and balance: constraint on executive power, from World Bank's Database of Political Institutions
UN voting: percentage of times the country voted the same way as the US in UN General Assembly in a particular year, from UN records
Average tariff: average statutory tariffs imposed on imports, from WITS
Note: a/ Following Wooldridge's (1995) suggestion for selection bias test for panel data, the second stage regressions are essentially pooled OLS.







2166 1832 1832 326
15.52 0.87 0.87 0.96
YY Y Y
NN N N
Annual Growth Rate Log(Pri Inv/GDP) Annual Growth Rate Annual Growth Rate
12 5 b/ 3
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# Commitments in WPRs Governance Index # Words in WPRs
Bulgaria 27 2.83 24542
Albania 29 2.84 38829
China 147 2.49 78641
Croatia 27 2.39 38479
Ecuador 21 2.56 25835
Estonia 24 4.76 22920
Georgia 29 1.32 27139
Jordan 29 3.26 36608
Kyrgyz 29 2.15 32149
Latvia 22 3.72 25717
Lithuthania 28 3.23 43029
Moldova 28 2.87 43859
Mongolia 17 2.91 12055
Oman 26 4.73 24695
Panama 24 3.91 19558
Mean
    Incl. China 33.8 3.06 32937
    Excl. China 25.7 29672
Median 27 2.87 27139
Standard dev.
    Incl. China 31.5 0.92 15537
    Excl. China 3.7 9370
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.131 -9.51 -0.134 -9.74
s = -3 0.082 0.36
-2 -1.142 -2.15 -0.262 -0.88 -1.060 -0.92 -0.534 -0.73
-1 -0.182 -0.80 0.117 0.99 -0.121 -0.13 -0.012 -0.08
0 -0.225 -1.07 -0.090 -0.71 -0.560 -0.48 -0.051 -0.08
1 -0.203 -0.92 -0.067 -0.62 0.830 0.60 0.457 0.74
2 -0.178 -0.72 0.071 -0.57 1.140 0.88 0.880 1.36
3 -0.436 -1.57 0.085 0.49 -0.192 -0.17 0.670 0.73
4 -0.400 -1.87 -0.140 -0.77 0.317 0.27 0.115 0.17
5 -0.240 -1.26 -1.780 -1.55
beyond -0.284 -1.53 0.073 0.65 -3.890 -3.17 -1.917 -1.94
s*log(# Commitments): -3 * log(# Com.) -0.022 -0.24
-2 * log(# Com.) 0.318 2.27 0.220 0.57
-1 * log(# Com.) 0.129 1.88 0.020 0.05
-0 * log(# Com.) 0.107 1.65 0.225 0.50
1 * log(# Com.) 0.105 1.56 -0.074 -0.18
2 * log(# Com.) 0.122 1.66 -0.135 -0.31
3 * log(# Com.) 0.220 2.17 0.307 0.64
4 * log(# Com.) 0.115 1.73 0.097 0.26
5 * log(# Com.) 0.122 2.18 0.680 1.97
beyond * log(# Com.) 0.215 2.55 0.534 1.07
s*Com. Dummy: -3 * # Com. >27
-2 * # Com. >27 0.076 1.10 0.043 0.28
-1 * # Com. >27 0.032 1.12 -0.021 -0.14
-0 * # Com. >27 0.071 2.05 0.104 0.60
1 * # Com. >27 0.057 1.77 0.047 0.22
2 * # Com. >27 0.037 1.25 -0.040 -0.22
3 * # Com. >27 0.047 1.03 0.073 0.27
4 * # Com. >27 0.023 0.59 0.198 1.24
5 * # Com. >27






     For regressions 1 and 3, countries acceding between 1995 and 2001 excluding China
     For regressions 2 and 4, all countries acceding between 1995 and 2001
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country
Note: All regressions include the interaction of accession time-profile and log(1995 per capita GDP in USD) as regressors (not reported)
Table 12. Average Effects of Policy Commitments on Changes in Growth and Investment
Log(Inv/GDP) Log(Inv/GDP)
34
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Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat. Coef est. t-stat.
Lagged log(GDP per capita) -0.137 -8.51 -0.142 -8.63
s*log(# Com.)*Gov Quality: -2 * log(#Com.) * gov. -1.552 -2.09 -4.920 -2.65
-1 * log(#Com.) * gov. -1.340 -2.85 -7.972 -5.60
-0 * log(#Com.) * gov. -0.971 -2.07 -6.821 -3.86
1 * log(#Com.) * gov. -1.504 -3.47 -8.375 -4.25
2 * log(#Com.) * gov. -1.479 -3.22 -8.440 -4.58
3 * log(#Com.) * gov. -2.674 -5.95 -9.659 -5.27
4 * log(#Com.) * gov. -1.488 -1.90 -9.357 -3.99
5 * log(#Com.) * gov. -0.861 -1.50 -1.962 -0.88
beyond * log(#Com.) * gov. -3.871 -4.09 16.750 3.82
s = -2 0.049 2.16 0.211 1.49
-1 0.046 3.00 0.220 1.69
0 0.054 3.04 0.298 1.98
1 0.085 4.07 0.385 2.50
2 0.085 3.97 0.455 3.20
3 0.111 2.99 0.655 3.75
4 0.032 1.50 0.469 3.92
beyond 0.082 3.48 0.470 3.65
s*Good Gov: -2 * Good Gov. -0.026 -0.80 -0.034 -0.19
-1 * Good Gov. -0.041 -1.63 -0.091 -0.58
-0 * Good Gov. -0.030 -1.22 -0.210 -1.22
1 * Good Gov. -0.028 -0.89 -0.251 -1.34
2 * Good Gov. -0.033 -1.06 -0.280 -1.58
3 * Good Gov. -0.054 -1.20 -0.402 -2.01
4 * Good Gov. 0.028 0.59 -0.233 -1.45
beyond * Good Gov. -0.074 -2.65 -0.287 -1.53
s*(Poor Gov, Few Com.): -2 * (Poor, Few) -0.089 -1.61 -0.258 -1.39
-1 * (Poor, Few) -0.081 -2.95 -0.241 -1.40
-0 * (Poor, Few) -0.082 -2.44 -0.367 -1.98
1 * (Poor, Few) -0.113 -3.15 -0.463 -2.24
2 * (Poor, Few) -0.080 -2.82 -0.391 -2.08
3 * (Poor, Few) -0.131 -2.88 -0.521 -2.56
4 * (Poor, Few) -0.035 -1.16 -0.400 -2.70





"Treatment" group: Countries acceding between 1995 and 2001, China excluded from regressions 1 and 2
"Control" group: All developing countries
Beginning period: 8 years before accessions
t-statistcs are based on robust standard errors clustered by country











1 a/ 2 a/
Log(Inv/GDP) Annual Growth Rate
Y
Y
1572 1769
Y
1780
0.30 0.48 0.29
Y
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 